Political Science 586 and 486:
Political Decision-Making

Jeffrey Dixon
Fall 2010

Image representing formal models of decision making

Class News

bullet Final course grades have been posted.  The following curve was applied to the grades: instead of dividing by 1000 points, grades were divided by 965 points.  See Course Documents below.

 

bullet For the exam, you should be able to apply decision-rules (maximax, minimax regret, maximin, poliheuristic), understand the conditions of utility functions and the prospect theory, solve games (using maximin, iterated dominance, Nash equilibria in both pure and mixed strategies, and subgame perfection), show that voting rules violate one or more of Arrow's assumptions, identify Cordorcet winners and Condorcet triplets, prove that a voting rule fits one of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite conditions, explain the impossibility of a Paretial liberal under Sen's theorem, create an example of Anscombe's paradox, apply the logic of collective action to determine whether individual action is rational under given circumstances, distinguish between analyses of group behavior relying on rational unitary actor, organizational process, bureaucratic/government politics, and groupthink explanations, find the median voter and weighted median voter in one or two dimensions and use the result to predict policy, illustrate the "chaos theorem" of voting in two dimensions, identify a structure-induced equilibrium, understand the Pareto-optimal set of bargaining outcomes, and be able to incorporate a valence issue into a spatial model of politics.

 

Downloads

Course Documents Syllabus for POLS 486 (undergraduates)

Syllabus for POLS 586 (graduate students)

Glossary of Mathematical Symbols and Terms

Homework Questions from throughout the course

Course Grades -- Sorted by the last 3 digits of your UIN (the number with all the zeroes)

Class Notes

Formal Models in Political Science

Class Notes for Sept 28

Class Notes for Nov 23

Class Notes for Dec 7

 

Course Calendar

Dates

Topic

Assigned Readings to be Completed Before Class

Paper Milestones

Aug 30

Symbols, Proofs, Models, and Theories

 

 

Sept 7

Decision Theory: Choice Under Uncertainty

Hansson, ALL (Blackboard)

Rawls, Sections 3, 4, 11, and 26 (Blackboard)

 

Sept 14

Evaluating Expected Utility Theory

Morrow, Chapter 2 (Blackboard)

Davis, Chapter 4 (Blackboard)

Neack, Chapter 3 (Blackboard)

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Sept 21

Game Theory I: Minimax and Nash

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, Chapters 1-2

Enders and Sandler, Chapter 4 (Blackboard)

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Sept 28

Game Theory II: Equilibrium Concepts

Mérö, Chapter 6 (Blackboard)

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, Chapter 3

Enders and Sandler, Chapter 7 (Blackboard)

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Oct 5

Game Theory III: Bargaining

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, Chapter 4

Meyerson, Chapter 2 (Blackboard)

Bazerman and Neale, Part One (Blackboard)

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Oct 12

Game Theory IV: The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Values

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, Chapter 5

Mérö, Chapter 4 (Blackboard)

Skyrms, Chapters 1-3 (Blackboard)

Puzzle and Literature Review

Oct 19

Game Theory V: Nonrational Components

Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, Chapters 6-7

 

Oct 26

Paradoxes of Social Choice I

Saari, Chapter 1 (Blackboard)

Arrow, ALL

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Nov 2

Paradoxes of Social Choice II

Aldrich (Blackboard)

Saari, Chapter 2 (Blackboard)

Revisions and Model Selection

Nov 9

Collective Action

Olson, Chapters 1-2 (Blackboard)

Barry, Chapter 2 (Blackboard)

 

Nov 16

Group Decisions

Neack, Chapter 4 (Blackboard)

Allison (Blackboard)

Be prepared to discuss your progress

Nov 23

Spatial Models in One Dimension: Voting and Bargaining

Black (Blackboard)

Barry, Chapter 5 (Blackboard)

Bueno de Mesquita and Organksi (Blackboard)

Bueno de Mesquita, A Decision-Making Model (Blackboard)

Revisions and Model Solution

Nov 30

Spatial Models in Two Dimensions: Bargaining and Voting

Morgan, Chapter 2 (Blackboard)

McKelvey (Blackboard)

Riker (Blackboard)

Krehbiel (Blackboard)

 

Dec 7

Forecasting Politics with Spatial Models

Bueno de Mesquita, A New Model for Predicting Policy Choices (Blackboard)

Final Paper

Dec 14

Final Exam

Review All

 

Calvin and Hobbes cartoon